A group of investigators has shared a 131-page security evaluation regarding SHRINCS, a suggested post-quantum signature framework for Bitcoin, inviting the broader community to search for potential vulnerabilities. Investigator Mikhail Kudinov revealed the initial release on Thursday through a thread on X, explaining that the paper ties SHRINCS’ security directly to the traits of its foundational hash function.
The evaluation, bearing the date November 18, calculates a classical security level spanning 121.4 to 122.7 bits for SHRINCS, though those calculations rely on conditions that incorporate three unproven assumptions. Kudinov mentioned that the research remains ongoing. The group continues to develop a fresh assessment concerning a characteristic known as SM-DSPR, whose boundary currently relies on speculation, as well as refining a reprogramming phase and strengthening protections against quantum adversaries.
How SHRINCS works
SHRINCS functions as a hash-driven system, meaning its protection depends on hash algorithms rather than the elliptic curve mathematics that power current Bitcoin signatures. It integrates two distinct architectures under a single key: a state-tracking segment built upon FXMSS alongside WOTS+C, and a stateless backup mechanism based on SLH-DSA. Because both mechanisms employ an identical hash algorithm, Kudinov noted that the cryptographic proof must account for both.
Data footprint remains the primary drawback. Under the proposed draft, stateful SHRINCS signatures extend from 548 to 4,619 bytes, while the stateless alternative reaches 5,777 bytes. Standard Schnorr signatures on Bitcoin today occupy 64 bytes, whereas ECDSA signatures typically measure around 71 bytes. Because signatures consume restricted block capacity, larger file sizes translate directly to fewer processed transfers per block.
The risk of a stateful signature
The compact stateful route introduces a specific danger. It depends on single-use keys, and should a user interface mistakenly reuse one, an adversary can fabricate a signature for that specific address and misappropriate the capital. Consequently, wallet applications must accurately maintain the status of every key. The stateless alternative circumvents this issue, but demands a significantly heavier footprint.
Jonas Nick, Blockstream’s research director, explained to Isabel Foxen Duke, leader of the MARA Foundation, during an appearance on MARA Foundation TV that wallets must automatically switch to the stateless route whenever a state counter faces risk. “It needs to be impossible for the user to behave in a way that this catastrophic event happens,” he stated. “Wallet developers need to deal with this stateful component correctly.”
Nick additionally cautioned that heavy reliance on larger signature sizes would strain the network. “We don’t know what the fee market will look like once we have these very big signatures,” he remarked. “And it’s not just the fee market, it’s also just fewer transactions fit into a block, meaning fewer people can use Bitcoin. And I think this changes the value proposition of Bitcoin.”
Researchers ask for review
The creators emphasize that the assessment requires thorough examination. Kudinov stated it lacks sufficient peer evaluation, and the initiative’s GitHub repository advises that the records might harbor inaccuracies and should not serve as the exclusive justification for implementing SHRINCS. “We tried to be careful, but a proof of this size can have mistakes,” he commented, urging readers to submit an issue report upon spotting any error.
The group also generated two findings independent of SHRINCS: a classical threshold for an attribute designated as ITSR absent reprogramming, and a quadratic quantum boundary for undetectability. Kudinov noted they extend to SPHINCS+ and SLH-DSA as well, the hash-based frameworks which inspired SHRINCS, and indicated they were released in separate publications.
The release of the SHRINCS research occurs as quantum threats gain prominence on the agenda. An international association of securities regulators recently warned that transitioning blockchains toward quantum-defended cryptography could prove uniquely challenging, and researchers recently developed a post-quantum safeguard for the Lightning Network following the execution of Bitcoin’s inaugural quantum-safe transfer without requiring a hard fork.
The draft Bitcoin Improvement Proposal regarding SHRINCS remains open for feedback as well. “We need all the possible feedback — engineers, cryptographers, protocol developers,” Kudinov, a post-quantum cryptography specialist at Blockstream, remarked regarding the proposal. “There are a lot of things to check, test, complain about, or praise.”
Originally published at https://bitcoinmagazine.com/news/blockstream-shrincs-security-shrincs.